{"id":94,"date":"2008-02-03T21:37:14","date_gmt":"2008-02-04T05:37:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cubist.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/02\/03\/cell-phone-gps-used-to-monitor-traffic\/"},"modified":"2008-02-04T02:13:12","modified_gmt":"2008-02-04T10:13:12","slug":"cell-phone-gps-used-to-monitor-traffic","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/02\/03\/cell-phone-gps-used-to-monitor-traffic\/","title":{"rendered":"Security Review: Cell Phone GPS"},"content":{"rendered":"

With the increasing popularity of auto-enabled GPS features in cell phones, a group at UC Berkeley<\/a>\u00a0is experimenting with using the phones as a means to gather real-time traffic information. The phones will broadcast their locations back to a central server at three-second intervals as students drive along a predetermined route. As speeds are aggregated, it is hoped that a model will emerge allowing for traffic statistics to be gathered in real time.<\/p>\n

While such an ability would undoubtedly be of use to a variety of organizations and benefit those stuck in traffic, this usage of GPS data from private cell phones is indicative of a developing change in the type of personally identifiable data available in the public realm. As such, it poses significant privacy concerns as long as steps to mitigate such threats go unimplemented.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The ability to locate a cell phone was originally mandated by federal law in 2005. Deemed an issue of personal safety, the goverment was concerned that cell phone users who dialed 9-1-1 might not be able to describe their location, and consequently couldn’t be helped unless some method of automatically locating them was developed. As a result, all cell phones made after 2005 have the capability to\u00a0locate the phone to within 100 meters.<\/p>\n

From a security perspective, there are several assets that must be considered as usage of GPS functionality increases. Of primary concern is clearly the location data being sent over the network by a client’s cell phone. Given the important role of GPS information in emergencies, it seems unlikely that the feature will disappear any time soon, but carriers and phone manufacturers should aim to ensure any positional data is not openly broadcast over the air and susceptible to being intercepted. Additionally, access to the phone or its data should be considered to be valuable and secured in such a way that will prevent an unauthorized user from spoofing a fake ID on the network.<\/p>\n

\u00a0When one considers how much information could be gleaned from merely tracking an individual’s GPS information, it becomes clear how important securing the GPS process is. Over the course of a day, an adversary (perhaps an identity thief, or\u00a0another surveilling party) might be able to glean the location of one’s home, place of business, bank, child’s school, and daily routine. All of this could be tied to one of the most easily obtained personal identifiers: a phone number. Such a wealth of information could easily\u00a0allow an adversary to carry out\u00a0a social engineering scheme to the detriment of the targeted party. Alternatively,\u00a0it might be sold to a third party with the intent of providing highly targeted information on a person’s preferences or habits. A store might wish to find out who shops at with a competitor, and then target them with telemarketing or mailings.<\/p>\n

\u00a0At this time, there are several ways in which an adversary might exploit the system in order to get tracking data from a user’s phone. In the case of a user who hasn’t explicitly set the phone to provide GPS information only to E911 providers, that information is often sent over the network at some interval, and is rarely encrypted, allowing a third party within range to intercept the phone’s coordinates. Alternatively, for those who’s phones provide location data only to E911, a malicious user could spoof an E911 session and trick the phone into transmitting its coordinates.<\/p>\n

In both cases,\u00a0cellular networks and phone manufacturers would benefit from establishing a secure protocol for the transmission of GPS data. Just as any online user would expect their shopping cart details to be encrypted and securely transmitted to a server, a mobile phone user should expect their sensitive location data to be handled similarly. Encryption would prevent anyone nearby from plucking the information out of the air, and an authentication scheme would stop spoofing efforts. Finally, a strong “opt-in” policy should be adopted by wireless carriers, ensuring that their networks don’t ask for location information without making sure the user is aware of such actions first.<\/p>\n

As GPS capabilities become more widely used by phones and their applications, there will undoubtedly be a\u00a0number of ways such information can be exploited. The host of privacy implications of making such data available is only likely to increase as both the government and private sector become more familiar with the technology and its capabilities. There can be little question about the usefulness of such a feature for a variety of purposes, but without a strong security backbone, there may prove to be a larger negative implication for the public’s privacy than is worth the added convenience of saving a few minutes in traffic.<\/p>\n

\u00a0For more information specifically on the legal ramifications of GPS enabled cell phones, see legalaffairs.org<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

With the increasing popularity of auto-enabled GPS features in cell phones, a group at UC Berkeley\u00a0is experimenting with using the phones as a means to gather real-time traffic information. The phones will broadcast their locations back to a central server … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":20,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9,5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-94","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-privacy","category-security-reviews"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/94","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/20"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=94"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/94\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=94"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=94"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=94"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}