{"id":58,"date":"2008-01-17T12:37:14","date_gmt":"2008-01-17T20:37:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cubist.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/17\/goa-says-the-irs-security-still-sucks\/"},"modified":"2008-01-17T12:45:49","modified_gmt":"2008-01-17T20:45:49","slug":"goa-says-the-irs-security-still-sucks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/17\/goa-says-the-irs-security-still-sucks\/","title":{"rendered":"GOA says &#8220;The IRS security still sucks&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>According to a  report Tuesday from the Government Accountability<br \/>\nOffice, sensitive taxpayer data housed at the IRS is critically<br \/>\nvulnerable to security threats.  The report is a follow up from March<br \/>\n2006 where the security problems were initially discovered.  The new<br \/>\nreport indicates that 70% of the issues discovered in March remain.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>The 33 page report details shortcomings including insufficiently<br \/>\ncomplex passwords, unnecessary access privileges for employees,<br \/>\nunencrypted data on laptops, and absence of logging or tracing on<br \/>\nsecurity sensitive data access. \u00a0The IRS responded to the report in<br \/>\nthe same manner as last year by acknowledging the problems and<br \/>\nassuring the GAO that a plan to tighten measures was in development.<\/p>\n<p>The GOA&#8217;s report is another example of a common security mistake:<br \/>\nfunctionality first, security second. \u00a0Retrofitting existing systems<br \/>\nto be secure is a flawed and slow \u00a0methodology for gaining security.<br \/>\nIt is understandable why it has taken the IRS years to even begin to<br \/>\ncorrect the problems, but the systems should not have been put into<br \/>\nproduction without a security review PRIOR to implementation. \u00a0Before<br \/>\nuser accounts are set up, the appropriate tiers of access rights<br \/>\nshould have been established. \u00a0Logging of sensitive data accesses<br \/>\nshould have been developed concurrently with the system&#8217;s<br \/>\nimplementation. \u00a0It&#8217;s not as if the data weren&#8217;t sensitive and then<br \/>\nsuddenly became a security risk: taxpayer data has ALWAYS needed to be<br \/>\nsecured. \u00a0Secure systems need to built from the ground up, and its<br \/>\ninconceivable that a high profile government agency such as the IRS<br \/>\nwould be prone to such a poor implementation.<\/p>\n<p>The dangerous aspect is, given the publicity of these reports, the<br \/>\nvulnerabilities are now available to whoever wants to pursue them.<br \/>\nIts as if the GAO has done the cracker&#8217;s initial reconnaissance. \u00a0For<br \/>\nexample, a crooked corporation interested in finding its way out of<br \/>\ntax database will read that the data warehouse systems have no audit<br \/>\ntrail and the passwords are stored on the intern&#8217;s laptop and may<br \/>\nthink to themselves &#8220;How about we go talk to that intern&#8230;&#8221;.<br \/>\nFurthermore, they&#8217;ve had over a year to scheme without the IRS making<br \/>\ncorrectional changes. \u00a0Due to exposure, the risk is increasing.<br \/>\nAdditionally, we have no way of knowing if a security violation even<br \/>\nhas occurred to date. The software industry already knows this<br \/>\nprinciple. You don&#8217;t hear Apple saying &#8220;we found a way a website may<br \/>\nexecute arbitrary code through Safari and it will be repaired on our<br \/>\nnext operating system release.&#8221; \u00a0That would be security suicide akin<br \/>\nto posting a note on your door saying its unlocked and where to find<br \/>\nthe jewelry.<\/p>\n<p>Its imperative that when issues like this come to light, the knowledge<br \/>\nof the vulnerabilities is controlled until the risk has been<br \/>\nmitigated. \u00a0Lets just hope with a second warning, the IRS makes the<br \/>\nappropriate steps to protect our information.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>According to a report Tuesday from the Government Accountability Office, sensitive taxpayer data housed at the IRS is critically vulnerable to security threats. The report is a follow up from March 2006 where the security problems were initially discovered. The &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/17\/goa-says-the-irs-security-still-sucks\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":47,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,8,9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-58","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-current-events","category-policy","category-privacy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/47"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=58"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=58"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=58"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=58"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}