{"id":38,"date":"2008-01-11T13:42:32","date_gmt":"2008-01-11T21:42:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cubist.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/11\/surveillance-cameras-security-reviews\/"},"modified":"2008-01-12T00:23:16","modified_gmt":"2008-01-12T08:23:16","slug":"surveillance-cameras-security-reviews","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/11\/surveillance-cameras-security-reviews\/","title":{"rendered":"Surveillance Cameras Security Reviews"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>    Surveillance cameras, or closed circuit television, is the  technology I am evaluating. For example, you generally see these camera  at a bank, gas stations, malls, and etc. They are different than  broadcast television because the signal is not openly transmitted,  although some systems might communicate through wireless links.<br \/>\nSome assets that the surveillance cameras are protecting are people  safety, confidential informations, and any other valuables. With the  surveillance cameras in place. If people get attack in the view of the  surveillance cameras, the event will be recorded so that the adversaries  can be punished. For confidential informations and other valuables, the  goal for the surveillance camera is to prevent information from being  stolen without gaining any information about the adversaries to catch  them. In addition to this goal, just having the camera in place will  make the adversaries think twice before doing anything illegal.<!--more--><br \/>\nPotential adversaries include common thieves, professional thieves,  and any other adversaries who would want the assets that the  surveillance cameras are protecting. For common thieves, threats to  attack surveillance vulnerabilities might be simple as wearing a mask or  to cover the cameras with paint. This way, the camera won&#8217;t be able to  identify the thieves or to record the crime. For professional thieves or  other adversaries, they might want to steal the assets without causing  commotions. In this case, and example of a threat would be hacking into  the surveillance system through internet (wireless) or the wires in the  system (non-wireless) to tamper with the cameras to tamper with the  things that the cameras are recording.<br \/>\nThere are many weakness in surveillance camera. First, they are  usually stationary. This gives the adversaries chances to study their  location and plan their attacks accordingly. Second, for the cameras  that moves, they tend to move in a pattern. This will also give the  adversaries a way to study the pattern and to avoid the cameras. Third,  they are fairly easy to get destroyed and there are many simple ways to  block the cameras. This gives the adversaries chances to completely  eliminate the surveillance system.<br \/>\nIn order to defend against these weaknesses, there are ways to  improve the cameras. First, if we create cameras that are not  stationary, meaning they move in random patterns in the store while  still covering the assets, this will make it harder for the adversaries  to spin point their locations easily. Second, if we random assign each  camera to cover different angles while maintaining a view for all the  assets that needs to be protected, then the adversaries can&#8217;t time the  camera movements. Third, if the camera are made of tougher materials,  for example, bulletproof glass and metal that can&#8217;t be broken so easily,  then the adversaries can&#8217;t destroy the cameras so easily. We can also  add defends mechanisms to the cameras such as hooking the surveillance  system to an taser gun or tranquilizer gun that fires to anything close  to the assets, or sleeping gas. Also, if we can have some of the cameras  in the system are less visible, then it will increase the chances that  the adversaries won&#8217;t be able to find it.<br \/>\nDepending of the assets we are trying to protect, for example, if the  surveillance cameras are for a convenience store, then most of the  assets are products in the store. Therefore, chances that these items  are being stolen by professional thieves are very unlikely, which means  that the cameras for those assets can be less &#8220;high tech&#8221;. However, some  improvement such as dealing with things blocking the cameras still need  to be fixed. On the other hand, if the cameras are trying to protect  highly confidential, important assets such as, famous artwork or human  lives, the surveillance cameras for these assets needs to have minimal  vulnerabilities. Therefore, weaknesses I mentioned above needs to be  fixed as soon as possible. These cameras need to have a higher tolerance  to treats. With the technology we have currently, I believe the assets  that are more important have surveillance cameras that have less  vulnerabilities. As technology evolves, I believe that more powerful  cameras will be invented while the current &#8220;high tech&#8221; cameras will  become more affordable to places with less critical assets. Thus, the  overall of security of surveillance cameras should increase.<br \/>\nI think surveillance cameras are very useful as a security system to  prevent crime and to record illegal activities. However, the treats to  attacks the hardware and software vulnerabilities seem to be too simple  to easy to create for the various adversaries. With the technology we  have, we can improve the cameras to decrease the vulnerabilities. Also,  as technology evolves, stronger cameras will be invented to boost up the  fault tolerance of the surveillance cameras.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Surveillance cameras, or closed circuit television, is the technology I am evaluating. For example, you generally see these camera at a bank, gas stations, malls, and etc. They are different than broadcast television because the signal is not openly transmitted, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/2008\/01\/11\/surveillance-cameras-security-reviews\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":26,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-38","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-security-reviews"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/26"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=38"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=38"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=38"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/secblog.cs.washington.edu\/Security\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=38"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}